Money market mutual funds : a reaction to government regulations or a lasting financial innovation? by Timothy Q. Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield
MONEY  MARKET  MUTUAL  FUNDS: 
A Reaction To Government  Regulations  Or 
A Lasting Financial Innovation? 
Timothy  Q.  Cook  and  Jeremy  G.  Duffield 
One  of  the  most  remarkable  changes  in  the  nation’s 
financial  system  in  recent  years  has  been  the  rapid 
growth  of  money  market  mutual  funds  (MMFs). 
These  funds  are  open-end  investment  companies  that 
invest  only  in  short-term  money  market  instruments. 
Although  the  first  MMF  started  offering  shares  to 
the  public  in  1972,  prior  to  1974  there  were  only  a 
couple  of  MMFs.  The  establishment  of  many  new 
MMFs  followed  the  very  high  money  market  rates 
in  1974  and  by  the  end  of  1975  there  were  roughly 
35  MMFs  in  existence  with  assets  totaling  just  under 
$4  billion.  The  level  of  MMF  assets  remained  in  a 
range  of $3  to  $4  billion  until  late  1977.  At  that  time, 
interest  rates  began  to  rise  and  aggregate  MMF 
assets  increased  sharply.  When  short-term  rates  con- 
tinued  to  rise  in  1978,  MMF  growth  accelerated  and 
in  the  first  five  months  of  1979  outstanding  shares 
grew  by  more  than  $2  billion  a  month.  As  shown  in 
Chart  1,  the  rapid  growth  in  MMF  shares  was  ac- 
companied  by  equally  rapid  growth  in  shareholder 
accounts,  to  a  level  of  about  1 million  in  May  1979.l 
The  general  operating  characteristics  of  MMFs  are 
fairly  standard,  although  there  are  some  differences. 
Investors  purchase  and  redeem  MMF  shares  without 
paying  a  sales  charge.  Expenses  of  the  funds  are 
deducted  daily  from  gross  income.  Minimum  initial 
investments  for  most  funds  vary  from  $500  to  $5,000, 
although  a  very  small  number  of  funds  require  no 
minimum  and  others,  designed  for  institutional  in- 
vestors  only,  require  minimums  of  $50,000  or  more. 
The  yield  paid  to  the  shareholder  of  a  MMF  depends 
primarily  on  the  yields  of  the  securities  held  by  the 
fund  but  is  also  dependent  on  the  expenses  of  the 
fund  and  its  accounting  policies.  Most  funds  have  a 
checking  option  that  enables  shareholders  to  write 
checks  of  $500  or  more.  Shares  can  also  be  re- 
deemed  at  most  MMFs  by  telephone  or  wire  request, 
1 The  shareholder  accounts  data  are  somewhat  difficult  to 
interpret  because  MMFs  differ  in  how  they  report  ac- 
counts  of  bank  trust  departments  and  other  institutional 
investors.  In  some  cases  a  bank  trust  department  is 
treated  as  one  account.  In  other  cases  each  of  the  ac- 
counts  of  the  bank  trust  department  are  treated  as 
separate  accounts. 
in  which  case  payment  by  the  MMF  is  either  mailed 
to  the  investor  or  remitted  by  wire  to  the  investor’s 
bank  account. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  examine  the  rea- 
sons  underlying  the  explosive  growth  of  MMFs. 
There  are  two  explanations  for  this  growth,  both 
stressing  a different  broad  function  served  by  MMFs. 
The  first  explanation  is  that  MMFs  are  primarily 
a  means  for  providing  access  to  money  market  yields. 
According  to  this  view,  government  regulations  and 
minimum  purchase  requirements  in  the  money  mar- 
ket  have  significantly  limited  the  ability  of  some  in- 
vestors  to  realize  market  yields  on  short-term  in- 
vestments.  MMFs  provide  such  investors  an  op- 
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of  return  close  to  the  yield  of  money  market  instru- 
ments.  To  the  extent  that  this  explanation  is  valid, 
one  can  argue  that  changes  in  certain  government 
regulations  would  largely  eliminate  the  appeal  of 
MMFs. 
The  second  explanation  for  the  growth  of  MMFs 
is  that  they  fill  a  vacuum  in  the  financial  system, 
which  previously  lacked  an  intermediary  specializing 
exclusively  in  short-term  assets  and  liabilities.  Ac- 
cording  to  this  view,  the  growth  in  MMFs  repre- 
sents  a  permanent  change  in  the  way  many  insti- 
tutional  and  individual  investors  manage  their  liquid 
assets.  This  change  has  occurred  because  MMFs 
offer  these  investors  the  advantages  that  result  from 
the  pooling  of  large  amounts  of  short-term  funds.2 
Briefly,  the  possible  advantages  are: 
Economies  of Scale  By  pooling  the  funds  of  many 
investors,  the  MMF  may  experience  lower  admini- 
strative  and  operating  costs  per  dollar  of  assets  than 
the  investors  themselves  could  achieve.  Conse- 
quently,  a  MMF  may  be  able  to  offer  some  investors 
a higher  rate  of  return  net  of  expenses  than  is  avail- 
able  to  them  through  direct  investment  in  money 
market  instruments. 
Liquidity  and  Divisibility  Money  fund  shares  can 
be  purchased  and  sold  on  any  business  day  without 
a  sales  charge.  Also,  because  of  the  short-term  na- 
ture  of  the  money  market  instruments  purchased  by 
MMFs,  the  investor  faces  a  relatively  small  proba- 
bility  of  loss  of  principal  due  to  interest  rate  flucta- 
tions.  Consequently,  a  purchase  of  money  fund 
shares  represents  a  highly  liquid  investment.  The 
checking  option  offered  by  most  MMFs  further  en- 
hances  the  liquidity  of  this  investment.  MMFs  are 
able  to  offer  such  liquidity  because  of  the  relatively 
large  size  of  their  portfolios,  which  allows  them  to 
schedule  maturities  so  that  they  usually  can  meet  re- 
demption  requests  without  selling  securities  prior  to 
maturity.  In  addition,  after  satisfying  the  initial 
minimum  investment  requirement,  additions  to  and 
withdrawals  from  MMFs  can  generally  be  made  in 
very  small  amounts.  By  contrast,  a  direct  invest- 
ment  in  money  market  instruments  lacks  this  di- 
visibility. 
Diversification  The  MMF  diversifies  its  port- 
folio  by  purchasing  instruments  of  a  wide  variety  of 
issuers.  This  might  expose  investors  in  the  fund 
to  lower  levels  of  risk  than  if  they  invested  their 
funds  directly  in  the  money  market. 
2 The  functions  of  financial  intermediaries  are  discussed 
in  Van  Horne  [13]. 
Of  course,  these  two  explanations  for  the  growth 
of  MMFs  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  In  fact,  the 
central  conclusion  of  this  article  is  that  the  growth 
of  MMFs  has  been  due  to  both  (1)  their  ability  to 
provide  access  to  the  money  market  to  those  pre- 
viously  excluded  and  (2)  the  advantages  they  offer 
some  investors  as  an  alternative  to  direct  investment 
in  the  money  market.  This  conclusion  is  based  on 
a  discussion,  presented  in  Section  I  of  this  paper,  of 
the  factors  influencing  the  participation  in  MMFs  by 
the  three  major  categories  of  MMF  investors,  and  on 
estimates,  presented  in  Section  III,  of  the  sources  of 
MMF  growth.  Section  II  discusses  the  determinants 
of  the  yields  paid  by  MMFs  to  shareowners. 
I.  MONEY  MARKET  FUND  INVESTORS 
This  section  discusses  the  factors  contributing  to 
the  attractiveness  of  MMFs  for  the  three  major  cate- 
gories  of  MMF  investors.  The  sectors  are  discussed 
in  the  order  of  their  importance  as  MMF  investors 
as  of  the  end  of  1978.  The  two  major  categories  of 
MMF  investors  are  individuals  and  bank  trust  de- 
partments.  The  third  most  important  investor  cate- 
gory  is  corporations,  although  this  sector  holds  a 
much  smaller  proportion  of  total  MMF  shares  than 
individuals  and  bank  trust  departments.  This  order- 
ing- (1)  individuals,  (2)  bank  trust  departments, 
and  (3)  corporations-is  also  the  order  of the  relative 
importance  of  access  to  money  market  yields  as  an 
explanation  for  the  use  of  MMFs  by  these  investors. 
That  is,  this  explanation  appears  to  be  an  important 
one  underlying  the  use  of  MMFs  by  individuals. 
The  access  explanation  applies  to  a  lesser  extent  to 
bank  trust  departments  and  appears  to  be  of  negligi- 
ble  importance  as  an  explanation  for  corporate  use  of 
MMFs.  For  these  investors,  and  also  for  those  in- 
dividuals  who  do  have  access  to  the  money  market, 
the  other  advantages  offered  by  the  MMF  as  a  fi- 
nancial  intermediary  for  short-term  funds  appear  to 
provide  the  primary  explanation  for  the  use  of 
MMFs. 
Individuals  The  role  of  MMFs  in  providing  ac- 
cess  to  money  market  yields  is  the  most  prevalent  ex- 
planation  for  the  use  of  MMFs  by  individuals.  Ac- 
cording  to  this  explanation,  the  small  individual  in- 
vestor  has  been  unable  to  earn  market  yields  be- 
cause  of  minimum  purchase  requirements  in  the 
money  market  and  because  regulations  limit  the  rate 
that  can  be  paid  on  time  and  savings  deposits  at  de- 
pository  institutions.  MMFs  are  attractive  to  small 
savers  because  they  provide  a  means  to  circumvent 
these  obstacles. 
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Treasury  bills  usually  require  investments-  of  at 
least  $25,000  and  more  often  $100,000  or  more. 
Furthermore,  since  1969,  purchases  of  Treasury  bills 
have  required  a  minimum  investment  of  $10,000. 
In  June  1978  banks  and  thrift  institutions  were  au- 
thorized  to  issue  6-month  “money  market  certifi- 
cates”  with  maximum  issuing  rates  tied  to  the 
average  6-month  Treasury  bill  discount  rate  estab- 
lished  at  the  weekly  Treasury  bill  auctions.  These 
certificates,  however,  carry  the  same  minimum  in- 
vestment  of  $10,000  as  Treasury  bills.  Consequently, 
the  only  short-term  investment  option  facing  the  in- 
vestor  with  less  than  $10,000  has  been  to  deposit 
his  funds  in  small  time  and  savings  deposits  at  the 
deposit  institutions3.  The  rates  paid  on  these  de- 
posits  are  subject  to  ceilings  established  under  Regu- 
Q  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act. 
In  recent  years  most  banks  and  thrifts  have  of- 
fered  the  maximum  rates  allowed  by  Regulation  Q. 
Consequently,  the  spread  between  money  market 
rates  and  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates  is  an  indicator 
of the  cost  of  limited  access  to  the  money  market  en- 
countered  by  savers  with  less  than  $10,000  of  short- 
term  funds.  Chart  2  shows  the  differentials  between 
the  3-month  Treasury  bill  rate  and  the  Regulation  Q 
passbook  savings  ceiling  rate  at  thrift  institutions 
(RTB-RPS)  and  between  the  3-month  certificate  of 
deposit  rate  and  the  thrift  passbook  rate  (RCD- 
RPS).  The  difference  between  the  two  lines  is  the 
differential  between  the  3-month  CD  and  Treasury 
bill  rates. 
As  shown  in  Chart  2,  for  much  of  the  past  decade 
money  market  interest  rates  have  been  significantly 
higher  than  the  savings  deposit  ceiling  rate.  The 
magnitude  of  the  spread  between  the  3-month  Treas- 
ury  bill  rate  and  the  savings  deposit  rate  in  such 
periods  as  1973-74  and  1978-79  illustrates  the  dis- 
advantage  suffered  in  periods  of  high  interest  rates 
by  individuals  with  less  than  $10,000  to  invest.  For 
these  individuals  MMFs  are  attractive  because  they 
provide  the  only  access  to  going  money  market 
yields. 
Even  for  individuals  possessing  the  $10,000  needed 
to  invest  in  Treasury  bills  or  money  market  certifi- 
3 Actually,  there  are  two  minor  exceptions  to  this  state- 
ment.  First.  as  of  July  1979,  small  savers  have  been 
allowed  to  pool  their funds  to  meet  the  $10,000  minimum 
necessary  to  purchase  money  market  certificates.  Second, 
long-term  U.  S.  government  securities  are  issued  in  de- 
nominations  of  less  than  $10,000.  As  these  securities 
approach  maturity  they  effectively  become  short-term 
investments.  Transactions  costs,  however,  substantially 
reduce  the  yield  of  such  an  investment  to  the  small 
investor. 
cates,  there  may  be  circumstances  under  which 
limited  access  to  the  yields  of  other  types  of  money 
market  instruments  influences  their  decision  to  use 
MMFs.  Chart  2  shows  that  in  past  periods  of  high 
interest  rates,  Treasury  bill  rates  have  often  been 
well  below  other  money  market  rates.  For  instance, 
the  spread  between  the  quarterly  average  3-month 
CD  and  Treasury  bill  rates  reached  levels  of  350 
basis  points  in  mid-1974  and  in  1978  was  as  high  as 
150  basis  points.  In  periods  of  rising  spreads  be- 
tween  the  rates  of  other  money  market  instruments 
such  as  CDs  and  commercial  paper  and  the  rate  on 
Treasury  bills,  the  yields  paid  by  many  money  market 
funds  will  rise  relative  to  the  yield  on  bills.  In  these 
circumstances  individuals  holding  bills  or  money 
market  certificates  may  use  MMFs  to  gain  access  to 
yields  on  money  market  instruments  other  than  bills.4 
While  the  role  of  MMFs  in  providing  small  savers 
access  to  money  market  yields  has  undoubtedly  been 
4 This  assumes  that  the  rise  in  the  spread  between  CD 
and  Treasury  bill  yields  was  not  solely  due  to  an  increase 
in  default  risk.  This  argument  is  made  by  Cook  [6]. 
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by  individuals,  evidence  on  average  size  of  individual 
MMF  accounts,  presented  later  in  the  paper,  indi- 
cates  that  many  individuals  who  have  sufficient  funds 
to  invest  directly  in  money  market  instruments,  or  at 
least  in  Treasury  bills,  are  also  using  MMFs.  For 
these  individuals  the  benefits  of  financial  intermedia- 
tion,  not  access,  provide  the  key  attraction  of  MMFs. 
This  is  an  important  distinction  because  it  implies 
that  even  in  the  absence  of  Regulation  Q  ceilings  at 
the  deposit  institutions,  individual  use  of  MMFs 
would  continue. 
Two  uses  of  MMFs  by  individuals  deserve  special 
attention  because  they  represent  innovations  in  the 
management  of  liquid  assets.  The  first  innovation  is 
the  large-scale  use  of  MMFs  by  stockbrokers  for  the 
purposes  of  investing  their  clients’  balances.  Many 
large  brokerage  firms  have  established  their  own 
MMFs.  Most  of  these  are  open  to  the  general  public 
but  are  used  mainly  by  the  brokers  of  the  firm  as  a 
liquid  parking  place  for  investors’  funds  that  become 
available  after  a  sale  of  stock  shares,  bonds,  etc. 
Many  brokers  unaffiliated  with  a  MMF  use  MMFs 
for  the  same  purpose.  Previously  after  a  sale  of  se- 
curities,  an  investor’s  funds  would  either  have  re- 
mained  uninvested,  been  placed  in  a  savings  account 
or  a  relatively  low-yielding  account  offered  by  the 
broker,  or  been  invested  directly  in  a  money  market 
instrument  if  the  amount  of  funds  made  this  pos- 
sible.  The  increased  liquidity  and  divisibility  MMFs 
provide  relative  to  direct  money  market  investment 
are  probably  especially  important  to  this  type  of  in- 
vestor.  Consequently,  as  a  competitive  measure, 
many  brokers  are  using  MMFs  to  ensure  that  their 
investors  remain  fully  invested  at  market  rates. 
The  second  innovation  is  the  use  of  exchange 
privileges  between  MMFs  and  other  funds  in  a  mu- 
tual  fund  group.  These  arrangements  allow  MMF 
investors  to  exchange  their  MMF  shares  for  shares 
in  any  of the  other  mutual  funds  in  the  group,  at  that 
fund’s  share  price,  plus  a  sales  charge  if  it  is  a  load 
fund.  Also,  shareholders  in  any  of  the  other  funds 
can  exchange  their  shares  for  the  MMF  shares.  The 
exchange  privilege  offers  individual  investors  the 
benefit  of  added  flexibility  in  their  investment  de- 
cisions,  allowing  them  to  move  in  or  out  of  differing 
types  of  mutual  funds  with  little  or  no  transactions 
costs.  Just  under  half  of  the  mutual  fund  groups 
whose  share  prices  are  listed  in  the  Wall  Street 
Journal  have  established  MMFs. 
Bank  Trust  Departments  The  second  important 
user  of  money  market  funds  is  bank  trust  depart- 
ments.  Trust  departments  serve  as  fiduciaries  for 
numerous  types  of  accounts  which  can  broadly  be 
divided.  into  two  groups  :  (1)  personal  trusts  and 
estates  and  (2)  employee  benefit  accounts.  If  funds 
from  these  accounts  were  invested  separately,  many 
of the  potential  advantages  of  intermediation,  such  as 
diversification  and  reduced  administrative  costs, 
would  be  lacking.  Furthermore,  individual  accounts 
of the  bank  trust  department  can  have  the  same  kind 
of  limited  access  problem  faced  by  individual  in- 
vestors.  Some  of  these  accounts  have  less  than 
$10,000  in  short-term  assets.  Consequently,  the  only 
available  short-term  investment  is  time  and  savings 
deposits  which,  as  shown  above,  has  frequently  paid 
rates  well  below  money  market  rates. 
In  order  to  gain  the  advantages  of  intermediation, 
trust  departments  can  establish  “collective  invest- 
ment  funds”  under  Regulation  9  of  the  Comptroller 
of  the  Currency.  Collective  investment  funds  for 
accounts  of  personal  trusts  and  estates  are  called 
“common  trust  funds.”  Collective  investment  funds 
pool  monies  from  different  accounts  of  the  trust  de- 
partment  and  invest  them  collectively.  Two  types  of 
collective  investment  funds  have  developed  for  the 
investment  of  short-term  funds.  The  first  type  to 
evolve  was  the  “variable  amount  note”  (also  called  a 
“master  note”),  which  is  a  revolving  loan  agreement, 
generally  without  a  specified  maturity,  negotiated 
with  a  business  borrower.”  Monies  from  various 
accounts  in  the  trust  department  can  be  put  into  the 
variable  amount  note  and  withdrawn  from  it  without 
fees  as  the  need  arises.  The  rate  paid  by  the  bor- 
rower  of  the  variable  amount  note  is  most  commonly 
the  “180  day  commercial  paper  rate  placed  directly 
by  major  finance  companies”  posted  in  the  Wall 
Street  Journal.6 
While  the  variable  amount  note  is  widely  used  by 
bank  trust  departments,  it  has  some  limitations. 
First,  the  participating  accounts  gain  little  in  the 
way  of  diversification.  Second,  the  agreement  with 
the  borrower  typically  specifies  maximum  and  mini- 
mum  limits  between  which  the  size  of  the  variable 
amount  note  must  vary.  These  limitations  reduce  the 
liquidity  of  a  variable  amount  note  investment  and 
may  necessitate  agreements  with  several  borrowers, 
each  of  which  requires  a  separate  plan,  thereby  in- 
creasing  administrative  expenses. 
As  a  result  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  variable 
amount  note,  a  second  type  of  collective  investment 
funds  for  short-term  investments,  called  a  “short- 
5 The  variable  amount  note  is  a  type  of  collective  invest- 
ment  fund  established  under  Regulation  9.18(c)(2)(ii)  of 
the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency. 
6 See  [1],  p.  25. 
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by  bank  trust  departments,  STIFs  are  essentially 
MMFs  operated  by  the  bank  trust  departments  for 
their  own  accounts.  The  STIF  pools  funds  from 
individual  accounts  of  the  trust  department  and  in- 
vests  those  funds  in  a  variety  of  short-term  money 
market instruments. 
Almost  all  STIFs  fall  into  two  broad  categories. 
The  first  group  is  for  accounts  of  personal  trusts  and 
estates.  These  STIFs,  operated  under  Regulation 
9.18(a)(1)  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  re- 
ceive  tax-exempt  status  under  the  condition  that 
income  earned  by  the  fund  is  distributed  to  partici- 
pating  accounts.  These  STIFs  are  also  limited  by 
the  requirement  that  no  participant  can  have  an 
interest  exceeding  10  percent  of  the  value  of  the 
fund.  The  second  type  of  STIF,  operated  under 
Regulation  9.18(a)(2)  of  the  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency,  is  for  the  accounts  of  pension,  profit 
sharing,  stock  bonus,  thrift,  and  self-employed  re- 
tirement  plans  that  are  exempt  from  taxation  under 
the  Internal  Revenue  Code.  Because  the  contributing 
accounts  are  themselves  tax-exempt,  the  second  type 
of  STIF  does  not  have  to  distribute  income  to  the 
participating  accounts  in  order  to  acquire  tax-exempt 
status.  In  addition,  this  type  of  STIF.  is  not  subject 
to  the  requirement  that  no  participant’s  interest  ex- 
ceeds  10  percent.  Under  IRS  regulations,  monies  of 
personal  trust  and  estate  accounts  and  “tax-exempt” 
accounts  cannot  be  mixed.  Hence,  if  a  bank  trust 
department  wishes  to  provide  STIF  services  to  both 
types  of accounts,  it  must  establish  both  a 9.18(a)(1) 
STIF  and  a  9.18(a)(2)  STIF. 
Unlike  all  other  types  of  collective  investment 
funds,  which  have  to  value  their  assets  on  a  current 
market  basis,  STIFs  are  permitted  to  value  their 
assets  on  a  cost  basis  and  use  the  “straight-line  ac- 
crual”  method  for  calculating  income  of  the  trust. 
Under  this  method  the  difference  between  cost  and 
anticipated  redemption  value  at  maturity  is  accrued 
in  a  straight-line  basis.  This  accounting  procedure  is 
generally  preferred  by  trust  departments  because  it 
smooths  out  the  flow  of  income  to  participating  ac- 
counts.  (An  expanded  discussion  of  straight-line 
accrual  versus  market  valuation  accounting  methods 
is  given  in  the  Box)  In  granting  this  exemption  to 
STIFs,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  has  imposed 
fairly  strict  restrictions  on  the  portfolios  of  STIFs. 
They  are: 
1.  80  percent  of  investments  must  be  payable  on 
demand  or  have  a  maturity  not  exceeding  91 
days, 
2.  assets  of  the  fund  must  be  held  to  maturity 
under  usual  circumstances, 
3.  not  less  than  40  percent  of  the  value  of  assets 
of  the  fund  must  be  composed  of  cash,  demand 
obligations,  and  assets  that  mature  on  the 
fund’s  next  business  day.7 
If  bank  trust  departments  have  the  option  of  oper- 
ating  a  STIF,  why  do  so  many  use  money  market 
funds?  There  are  two  possible  answers  to  this  ques- 
tion.  The  first  is  that  restrictive  regulations  on 
STIFs  induce  bank  trust  departments  to  use  MMFs, 
at  least  for  some  of  their  accounts.  STIFs  are 
affected  by  both  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  regu- 
lations  and  various  state  regulations.  As  explained 
above,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency’s  regulations 
impose  fairly  stringent  conditions  on  the  portfolios 
of  STIFs.  In  addition,  regulations  require  that 
separate  funds  be  established  for  accounts  of personal 
trusts  and  estates  and  for  employee  benefit  plans. 
Furthermore,  under  Comptroller  of  the  Currency 
regulations,  agency  accounts  of  personal  trusts  and 
estates  are  not  permitted  to  invest  in  common  trust 
funds.  Agency  accounts  are  those  for  which  the 
owner  retains  title  to  the  property  and  only  delegates 
to  the  bank  trust  department  certain  responsibilities. 
The  state  regulation  most  seriously  affecting  the 
establishment  of  STIFs  was  a  New  York  law  that 
imposed  heavy  reporting  requirements  on  STIFs  for 
personal  trust  and  estate  accounts.8  As  a  result  of 
these  requirements,  almost  no  9.18(a)(1)  STIFs 
have  been  established  in  New  York.  Since  at  the  end 
of  1977  New  York  bank  trust  departments  had  29.3 
percent  of  all  trust  department  assets,  this  regulation 
probably  directed  a  significant  amount  of  money  to 
MMFs  that  otherwise  might  have  gone  into  STIFs. 
The  heavy  reporting  requirements  on  STIFs  were 
eliminated  by  a  revision  in  the  New  York  law  passed 
in  mid-1979. 
7 The  aggregate  portfolio  of  STIFs  appears  to  reflect  the 
Comptroller  of  the  Currency’s  regulations.  In  a  survey 
of  collective  investment  funds  at  the  end  of  1978  con- 
ducted  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  24 percent  of 
total  STIF  assets  was  variable  amount  notes  (“master 
notes”),  56.9  percent  was  commercial  paper,  4.3  percent 
was  U.  S.  Treasury  and  agency  securities,  and  .8  percent 
was  cash.  The  remaining  14 percent  was  mostly  time  and 
savings  deposits,  although  a  small.  part  was  bankers’  ac- 
ceptances  and  repurchase  agreements.  (Because  of  the 
way  the  data  were  collected,  it  was  not  possible  to  sepa- 
rate  CDs  from  other  time  and  savings  deposits.) 
8 The  New  York  law  required  a periodic  accounting  from 
common  trust  funds  for  personal  trust  and  estate  ac- 
counts  before  the  surrogate  court.  This  accounting 
required  a  record  of  all  transactions  of  the  fund. 
cause  of  the  volume  of  transactions  of  a  STIF,  this 
required  accounting  discouraged  N.  Y.  banks  from  estab- 
lishing  9.18(a)(l)  STIFs. 
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MMF  ASSET  VALUATION  AND  YIELD  DETERMINATION 
There  are  two  commonly  used  methods  of  valuing  a 
MMF’s  portfolio  of  assets  and  of  calculating  yields: 
the  mark-to-market  and  the  amortized  cost  or 
straight-line  accrual  methods.  The  issue  of  the  most 
appropriate  method  has  been  hotly  debated.  The 
following  paragraphs  describe  the  various  accounting 
techniques  and  then  explain  the  arguments  in  the  con- 
troversy  over  which  method  is  more  appropriate  for 
MMFs. 
The  most  important  distinction  between  the  ac- 
counting  policies  of  MMFs  is  in  the  method  used  to 
determine  the  asset  value  of  the  investment  portfolio. 
Marking-to-market,  as  its  name  implies,  involves  ap- 
praising  portfolio  assets  at  their  estimated  market 
value.  In  the  case  of  securities  for  which  active 
secondary  markets  exist,  this  means  valuing  the  se- 
curity  at  its  most  recent  bid  price,  or  alternatively,  at 
the  mean  of  the  most  recent  bid  and  asked  prices. 
Securities  which  are  not  actively  traded,  such  as  com- 
mercial  paper,  are  generally  valued  by  comparison 
with  marketable  securities  of  similar  type,  yield,  qual- 
ity,  and  time  to  maturity. 
In  contrast  to  mark-to-market,  amortized  cost  valu- 
ation  does  not  allow  changes  in  market  interest  rates 
to  affect  the  value  of  the  MMF’s  portfolio.  The 
amortized  cost  method  establishes  the  cost  of  a  se- 
curity  on  the  date  of  purchase  (or  sometimes  the  mar- 
ket  value  on  a  date  after  purchase)  as  its  “fair  value.” 
The  difference  between  the  security’s  cost  and  its 
redemption  value  at  maturity  is  accrued  daily  on  a 
straight-line  basis  as  an  increase  in  the  value  of  the 
asset. 
Under  both  mark-to-market  and  amortized  cost 
methods  of  valuation,  “net  asset  value”  of  a  fund  is 
the  calculated  asset  value  of  the  portfolio  minus  the 
“income”  earned  that  day.  The  fund’s  net  income, 
income  minus  expenses,  is  credited  to  shareholders’ 
accounts  daily  and  usually  paid  monthly.  The  MMF’s 
share  price  is  the  net  asset  value  divided  by  the 
number  of  shares  outstanding. 
The  amortized  cost  valuation  method  leads  to  a 
constant  share  price  because  each  security’s  value  is 
“locked  in”  on  the  purchase  date  and  the  straight-line 
increase  in  its  value  (the  income  earned  on  the  se- 
curity)  is  credited  as  dividends,  after  expenses  are 
deducted,  to  shareholders  daily.  The  net  asset  value 
per  share  could  change  only  if  the  MMF  found  it 
necessary  to  sell  a security  at  a price  different  from  its 
asset  value  determined  by  amortized  cost  or  if  the  is- 
suer  of  one  of  the  securities  in  the  portfolio  defaulted. 
Among  MMFs  that  value  by  marking-to-market 
there  is  considerable  variation  in  the  method  of  deter- 
mining  share  price.  There  are  three  methods: 
(1)  Many  MMFs  maintain  a  constant  share  price, 
usually  $1.00,  allowing  the  number  of  shares 
owned  by  each  shareholder  to  vary.  Interest  in- 
come  and  capital  appreciation  (realized  or  un- 
realized)  net  of  expenses  accrue  daily  to  the 
shareholder  in  the  form  of  additional  shares.  If 
the  MMF’s  expenses  and  capital  depreciation  are 
greater  than  its  interest  income  that  day,  each 
investor’s  shares  will  be  correspondingly  reduced. 
(2)  Another  group  of  MMFs  ordinarily  maintains  a 
constant  share  price,  but  reflects  increases  in  port- 
folio  value  by  increasing  dividends.  Similarly,  a 
depreciating  portfolio  is-reflected  in  reduced  divi- 
dends.  In  the  event  that  unrealized  and  realized 
capital  losses  plus  expenses  are  greater  than  daily 
interest  income.  the  MMF  will  first  respond  by 
reducing  dividends  already  credited  to  sharehold- 
ers  during  the  month,  and  if  this  is  not  sufficient, 
the  MMF  will  lower  its  share  price. 
(3)  Unlike  the  other  two  groups  of  MMFs  that  mark- 
to-market,  a  third  group  does  not  include  unreal- 
ized  capital  gains  or  losses  in  the  calculation  of 
income  but  allows  the  net  asset  value  and  the 
share  price  to  fluctuate  with  market  interest  rates. 
If  rates  rise  (fall),  the  share  price  will  fall  (rise). 
The  extent  of  the  change  in  share  price  will  de- 
pend  on  the  maturity  schedule  of  the  portfolio 
and  the  magnitude  of  the  change  in  market  rates. 
In  this  case,  the  shareholder  has  two  variables  to 
monitor  to  determine  his  effective  yield:  divi- 
dends  and  share  price. 
The  distinctive  feature  of  amortized  cost  valuation  is 
that  it  isolates  the  share  pricing  and  daily  yield  deter- 
mination  from  the  fluctuations  of  the  market.  The 
greater  stability,  both  in  principal  and  in  daily  yield, 
that  this  method  leads  to,  relative  to  the  mark-to- 
market  method,  is  very  appealing  to  certain  institu- 
tional  investors,  especially  bank  trust  departments, 
who  have  difficulty  justifying  to  their  clients  yields 
that  vary  widely  from  day  to  day.  For  these  reasons, 
most  trust  departments  consider  amortized  cost  to 
be  the  preferable  valuation  method,  and  some  even 
consider  MMFs  using  mark-to-market  valuation  to 
be  an  unacceptable  form  of  investment. 
Despite  the  preference  of  bank  trust  departments 
for  amortized  cost  valuation,  the  Securities  and  Ex- 
change  Commission  has  stated  in  an  interpretative 
release  that  MMFs  may  use  amortized  cost  valuation 
only  for  securities  of  60  days  or  less  to  maturity  and 
that  mark-to-market  valuation  must  be  used  for  se- 
curities  of  longer  maturity.l  The  Commission  has 
argued  that  amortized  cost  is  an  inappropriate  method 
of  determining  the  asset  value  of  securities  of  more 
than  60 days  to  maturity  because  it  does  not  take  into 
account  changes  in  market  value  and,  therefore,  the 
interest  of  existing  shareholders  could  be  diluted  under 
certain  circumstances.  Such  a  situation  could  occur  if 
market  interest  rates  rise  (fall)  and  there  are  sub- 
stantial  net  redemptions  (sales)  of  the  MMF’s  shares. 
For  instance,  if  interest  rates  rise,  the  market  value 
of  the  MMF’s  assets  will  fall  below  the  value  “locked 
in”  by  amortized  cost  valuation.  (The  extent  of  the 
fall  is  directly  related  to  the  length  of  maturity  of 
the  fund’s  portfolio.)  Hence,  the  MMF’s  assets  are 
“overvalued”  in  the  sense  that  the  fund  is  carrying 
them  at  a  value  above  their  market  value.  If  share 
redemptions  subsequently  exceed  sales  and  if  the  fund. 
1 SEC  Release,  No.  IC-9786,  May  31,  1977. 
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redemption  requests,  these  securities  are  sold  at  prices 
below  that  at  which  they  are  valued  by  the  fund. 
Shareowners  redeeming  their  shares  are  paid  the  con- 
stant  share  price,  but  remaining  shareholders  are  stuck 
with  a  portfolio  of  lower  asset  value  per  share.  This 
must  be  reflected  in  lower  dividends  or  a  reduced 
share  price  for  remaining  shareholders. 
In  the  case  of  falling  interest  rates,  the  appreciation 
of  portfolio  assets  accrues  immediately  to  existing 
shareholders  under  mark-to-market  valuation.  But 
under  amortized  cost,  this  benefit  accrues  in  the  form 
of  higher  (relative  to  the  market)  daily  income.  If 
share  sales  exceed  redemptions,  however,  this  benefit 
must  be  spread  across  more  shares.  As  a  result,  the 
return  to  existing  shareholders  is  diluted. 
Although  some  MMFs,  many  of  them  dealing  ex- 
clusively  with  institutions,  have  sought  permission  to 
use  amortized  cost,  the  SEC  has  continued  its  efforts 
to  restrict  the  use  of  amortized  cost.  The  Commission 
did  grant  temporary  exemptions  under  certain  condi- 
tions  in  November  1977  to  10  MMFs  and  shortly 
afterwards  to  4  others,  until  full  judicial  disposal  of 
the  matter.  However,  prior  to  the  beginning  in  No- 
vember  1978  of  the  hearing  that  was  to  resolve  the 
issue,  the  majority  of  the  funds  involved  arrived  at  a 
compromise.2  They  agreed  to  use  mark-to-market 
valuation  for  assets  of  more  than  60  days  to  maturity 
and  to  maintain  a  dollar-weighted  average  maturity  of 
120  days  or  less  (to  minimize  fluctuations  in  asset 
value).  In  return  they  were  permitted  by  the  SEC 
to  price  their  shares  to  the  nearest  one  penny  on  a 
$1.00  share  price  (“penny  rounding”)  instead  of  the 
one-tenth  of  a penny  accuracy  the  SEC  had  previously 
required. 
“Penny-rounding”  was  considered  an  adequate  alter- 
native  to  amortized  cost  by  the  MMFs  who  joined 
this  agreement,  because  it  was  thought  to  enable  the 
funds  to  maintain  a  constant  share  price  and  thus 
provide  a very  stable  investment  for  institutions.  The 
MMF’s  share  price  would  not  diverge  from  $1.00  un- 
less  the  fund’s  net  asset  value  per  share  went  to 
$0.9949  or  $1.0050,  an  event  thought  unlikely  given  the 
agreed  restriction  on  the  maturity  of  the  portfolio. 
Some  bank  trust  departments  found  even  this  valu- 
ation  method  unacceptable.  One  MMF  that  had  used 
amortized  cost  but  agreed  to  the  penny-rounding 
compromise  lost  one  bank  trust  department’s  invest- 
ment  of  $44  million.  The  MMFs  involved  in  the  legal 
dispute  that  did  not  agree  to  the  penny-rounding 
compromise  have  continued  the  litigation  over  the  use 
of  amortized  cost.  At  the  time  of  writing,  offers  of 
settlement  which,  if  accepted,  would  allow  the  use  of 
amortized  cost  under  certain  restrictions  have  been 
filed  by  the  MMFs  participating.  The  SEC’s  Division 
of  Investment  Management  has  recommended  these 
offers  of  settlement  be  approved.  The  decision  of  the 
Commission  is  pending. 
2 SEC  Release,  No.  IC-10451,  October  26,  1978. 
While  the  regulations  cited  above  may  have  had 
some  impact  on  the  decision  of  bank  trust  depart- 
ments  to  use  STIFs,  the  advantage  of  size  in  the 
operation  of  short-term  financial  intermediaries,  such 
as  STIFs  and  MMFs,  has  probably  been  a  more 
important  determinant.  According  to  this  line  of 
reasoning,  small-  and  medium-sized  bank  trust  de- 
partments  use  MMFs  rather  than  establishing  STIFs 
because  the  greater  size  of  MMFs  enables  them  to 
better  provide  the  benefits  of  intermediation  dis- 
cussed  earlier.  A  potentially  key  benefit  is  economies 
of  scale  resulting  in  lower  average  costs  for  large 
MMFs  (and  large  STIFs)  than  for  relatively  small 
STIFs.  In  the  presence  of  these  economies  of  scale, 
small-  and  medium-sized  trust  departments  could 
earn  a  higher  yield  net  of  expenses  for  their  accounts 
by  placing  their  short-term  funds  in  MMFs  than  by 
establishing  STIFs. 
If  this  second  explanation  for  the  use  of  MMFs 
by  bank  trust  departments  is  accurate,  there  should 
be  a  positive  relationship  between  the  size  of  bank 
trust  departments  and  their  use  of  STIFs.  That  is, 
larger  bank  trust  departments  should  be  more  likely 
to  establish  STIFs  than  smaller  bank  trust  depart- 
ments.  A  survey  of  collective  investment  funds  at 
the  end  of  1978  provides  convincing  evidence  of 
this  relationship.  This  survey,  done  by  the  Comp- 
troller  of  the  Currency,  covered  almost  1000  bank 
trust  departments  and  included  almost  all  of  those 
that  operate  collective  investment  funds.  Ninety-six 
banks  in  the  survey  had  STIFS.9  Of  these,  68  were 
national  banks.  By  comparing  the  bank  trust  de- 
partments  in  this  group  with  the  total  universe  of 
national  bank  trust  departments,  it  is  possible  to 
get  a  distribution  of  STIFs  according  to  size  of 
bank  trust  department.  This  distribution  is  shown 
in  Table  I.  The  table  shows  negligible  use  of  STIFs 
by  bank  trust  departments  with  less  than  $100  mil- 
lion  in  assets  and  only  slight  use  by  trust  depart- 
ments  with  $100  million  to  $500  million  in  assets. 
In  contrast,  38.5  percent  of  the  trust  departments 
with  assets  of  $500  million  to  $1  billion  had  STIFs 
and  64.6  percent  of  the  departments  with  assets  of 
greater  than  $1  billion  had  STIFs.10  Finally,  it 
9 These  96  banks  operated  a  total  of  147  STIFs.  Total 
assets  of  these  STIFs  were  $15.2  billion.  Seventy-six  of 
the  STIFs,  with  $4.4  billion  of  assets,  were  9.18(a)(1) 
funds,  while  69 of  the  STIFs,  with  $10.4  billion  of  assets, 
were  9.18(a)(2)  funds.  The  other  two  funds  were 
covered  by  Section  9.18(c)(5)  of  Regulation  9. 
10 All  of  the  percentages  in  Table  I  may  be  understated 
somewhat  because  the  data  on  STIFs  were  collected  from 
the  common  trust  fund  survey  before  the  survey  was 
checked  for  delinquencies.  This  would  not,  however, 
have  a  significant  effect  on  the  relative  magnitude  of  the 
percentages  shown  in  Table  I. 
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THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  STlFs 
BY  SIZE  OF  BANK  TRUST  DEPARTMENT 
(National  Banks  Only) 
No.  of  Trust 
Size  of  Bank  No.  of  Trust  Departments 
Trust  Department  Departments  with  STlFs  Percent 
Less than  $10  million  960  0  0.0 
$10  to  $25  million  248  1  0.4 
$25  to  $100  million  295  2  0.7 
$100  to  $500  million  191  19  9.9 
$500  million  to  $1  billion  39  15  38.5 
More  than  $1  billion  48  31  64.6 
Note:  Bank  trust  departments  reporting  zero  assets  were  ex- 
cluded  from  the  sample.  The  bank  trust  department  distribu- 
tion  is  as  of  December  31,  1977;  the  STIF  survey  data  were 
collected  for  fiscal  year  end  dotes  ranging  over  1978. 
Sources:  “Common  Trust  Fund  Survey-1978,”  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency;  “Trust  Assets  and  Number  of  Accounts  of  National 
Banks  With  Trust  Departments  as  of  December  31,  1977,” 
Comptroller  of  the  Currency. 
should  be  noted  that  many  bank  trust  departments 
that  have  STIFs  nevertheless  use  MMFs  to  some 
extent,  especially  for  those  agency  accounts  that  are 
not  permitted  to  be  invested  in  common  trust  funds. 
STIFs,  themselves,  may  also  invest  in  MMFs  as  a 
means  of  satisfying  the  40  percent  liquidity  require-, 
ment. 
These  survey  results  make  it  clear  that  size  is  the 
primary  factor  underlying  a  bank  trust  department’s 
decision  on  whether  or  not  to  operate  a  STIF.11  The 
third  article  in  this  Review  provides  empirical  sup- 
port  for  the,  contention  that  there  are  economies  of 
scale  in  the operation  of  financial  intermediaries  for 
short-term  funds.  These  economies  of  scale  provide 
an  explanation  for  the  decision  of small-  and  medium- 
sized  trust  departments  to  use  MMFs  rather  than 
operate  their  own  STIFs. 
Corporations  A  third  category  of  MMF  invest- 
ors  is  nonfinancial  corporations.  While  this  sector 
has  a  very  large  amount  of  funds  held  in  short-term 
financial  assets,  its  use  of  MMFs  to  date  has  been 
limited  relative  to  individuals  and  bank  trust  depart- 
ments.  In  discussing  the  attractiveness  of  MMFs  as 
an  investment  alternative  for  nonfinancial  corpora- 
tions,  it  is  useful  to  consider  two  components  of  cor- 
porate  liquid  financial  holdings  :  ( 1)  assets  held  for 
transactions  purposes  and  (2)  assets  held  for  a 
11 Bent  [2]  asked  marketers  of  STIF  computer  packages 
at  an  ABA  Midcontinent  Trust  Convention  at  what 
level  a  STIF  made  economic  sense.  The  reply  was  that 
“a  department  with  $500  million  in  assets  would  realize 
an  advantage.”  That  reply  is  consistent  with  these 
survey  results. 
slightly  longer  period  and  usually  invested  in  the 
money  market. 
MMFs  and  Transactions  Balances  As  noted,  most 
MMFs  offer  checking  for  amounts  of  $500  or  more. 
The  payment  of  explicit  interest  on  demand  deposits 
at  banks  is  prohibited  by  the  Banking  Act  of  1933. 
Since  corporations  hold  a  large  amount  of  demand 
deposits,  the  opportunity  to  write  large  checks  on 
MMF  shares  would  appear  to  have  created  a  poten- 
tial  role  for  MMFs  in  corporate  cash  management. 
The  comparison  of  money  market  fund  shares  to 
demand  deposits,  however,  is  complicated  by  the  fact 
that  banks  do  pay  an  implicit  rate  of  return  on  de- 
mand  deposits,  This  return  is  paid  in  the  form  of 
lines  of  credit,  use  of  credit,  cash  management  ser- 
vices  and  other  banking  services.  Clearly,  MMF 
shares  cannot  be  considered  a  substitute  for  demand 
deposits  held  to  compensate  a  bank  for  services  it 
alone  provides.  To  the  extent  that  the  checking 
privilege  of  most  MMFs  can  be  substituted  for  this 
service  provided  by  banks,  however,  MMFs  may 
enable  corporations  to  reduce  the  amount  of  com- 
pensating  balances  held.12 
The  regulatory  prohibition  of  payment  of  interest 
on  demand  deposits  has  encouraged  substantial  cor- 
porate  involvement  in  the  repurchase  agreement 
(RP)  market.  Corporate  demand  deposits  in  excess 
of  compensating  balances  are  often  invested  over- 
night  in  RPs  arranged  through  the  bank.  A  com- 
parison  of  rates  offered  on  RPs  by  government  se- 
curities  dealers  and  average  MMF  yields  for  1978 
and  the  first  four  months  of  1979  shows  very  little 
difference.13  As  bank  fees  for  investing  in  overnight 
RPs  are  likely  to  be  higher  than  the  cost  of  investing 
in  MMF  shares,  which  consists  only  of  wire  charges, 
MMFs  appear  to  have  offered  corporations  a  com- 
petitive  alternative  to  RPs  in  this  period.  Also, 
MMFs  appear  to  provide  an  overnight  investment 
opportunity  for  those  corporations  without  sufficient 
funds  to  meet  the  substantial  minimum  purchase 
requirements  on  RPs. 
Despite  the  fact  that  MMFs  appear  to  represent  a 
partial  substitute  for  conventional  means  of  holding 
12  Also  there  are  some  banking  services  that  may  be 
paid  for  in  fees,  rather  than  by  holding  compensating 
balances.  To  the  extent  that  paying  fees  allows  the  cor- 
poration  to  economize  on  its  demand  deposit  holdings, 
funds  are  freed  for  investment  elsewhere.  If  the  cor- 
poration  wishes  to  keep  these  funds  liquid,  MMFs  might 
be  an  attractive  option. 
13  MMF  yields  used  in  this  comparison  are  from  Donog- 
hue’s  Money  Fund  Report  of  Holliston,  Mass.  RP  yields 
are  averages  of  yields  offered  by  government  securities 
dealers. 
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over  rates  strongly  suggests  that  neither  corporations 
nor  other  MMF  investors  have  used  MMFs  exten- 
sively  for  transactions  purposes.  Turnover  rates  of 
demand  deposits,  savings  deposits,  and  MMF  shares 
are  presented  in  Table  II.  These  rates  are  measured 
as  total  debits  or  redemptions  in  a  given  month 
times  12  (to  annualize)  divided  by  the  average  level 
of  deposits  or  shares  outstanding.  The  data  shown 
are  for  every  third  month  beginning  in  July  1977, 
the  first  month  the  savings  deposit  turnover  rates 
are  available.  Over  the  period  shown  in  the  table, 
the  turnover  rate  of  MMF  shares  varied  from  3  to  4. 
In  sharp  contrast,  the  turnover  rate  of  demand  de- 
posits  was  in  a  range  of  128  to  157  per  year.  The 
turnover  rate  for  MMF  shares  is  about  halfway 
between  the  turnover  rates  for  business  savings  de- 
posits  and  individual  savings  deposits.  After  adjust- 
ing  for  the  greater  percentage  of  business  and  other 
institutional  money  in  MMFs,  as  opposed  to  savings 
deposits,  the  aggregate  turnover  rate  for  MMFs  is 
remarkably  similar  to  the  aggregate  turnover  rate  for 
savings  deposits. 
The  aggregate  MMF  share  turnover  rates  are  so 
low,  relative  to  demand  deposit  turnover  rates,  that 
they  strongly  indicate  that  corporations  have  not  used 
MMFs  for  transactions  purposes  to  any  significant 
degree.  It  might  be  argued  that  since  corporations 
hold  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  MMF  shares, 
the  aggregate  data  are  masking  heavy  share  turnover 
among  some  funds  that  deal  more  heavily  with  cor- 
porations.  Examination  of  individual  MMF  turn- 
over  rates,  however,  provide  little  support  for  this 
conjecture.  Turnover  rate  data  for  40  individual 
MMFs  over  an  annual  period  are  listed  in  the  ac- 
companying  article  [7].  This  group  of  40  funds  en- 
compasses  all  types  of funds,  including  those  that  deal 
only  with  institutions  and  some  that  deal  heavily  with 
corporations.  Yet  only  2  of  the  40  funds  had  share 
turnover  rates  greater  than  8  in  the  period  covered. 
One  small  fund  had  a  turnover  rate  of  28,  suggesting 
that  its  shares  were  being  used  for  transactions  pur- 
poses.  In  fact,  this  fund’s  turnover  rate  subsequently 
reached  a  level  of  over  100,  but  then  dropped  sharply 
to  2. 
Two  reasons  can  be  advanced  for  the  limited  cor- 
porate  use  of  MMFs  for  transactions  purposes. 
First,  certain  features  of  MMF  share  purchase  and 
redemption  systems  lessen  the  attractiveness  of 
MMFs  as  a  substitute  for  repurchase  agreements. 
Secondly,  MMFs  may  be  unwilling  to  allow  shares 
to  turnover  very  rapidly. 
The  share  purchase  and  redemption  systems  of 
almost  two-thirds  of  MMFs  surveyed  prevent 
these  MMFs  from  being  used  by  corporations  as  a 
substitute  for  overnight  RPs  because  a  corporation 
can  not  invest  in  one  of  these  MMFs  one  day,  and 
receive  payment  with  one  day’s  dividends  the  follow- 
ing  day.  An  investment  in  one  of  these  MMFs  en- 
tails  the  loss  of one  day’s  dividends  (unless  shares  are 
redeemed  by  check),  which  results  in  a  significant 
reduction  in  the  rate  of  return  of  an  investment 
placed  for  just  a  couple  of  days.  Thus,  these  MMFs 
are  not  a  substitute  for  overnight  RPs,  nor  do  they 
provide  a  competitive  yield  on  an  investment  for  just 
a  few  days.14 
14 A  survey  of  MMF  prospectuses  revealed  that  39  of  61 
MMFs  in  the  survey  effect  share  purchase  and  redemp- 
tion  orders  once  each  business  day  at  the  close  of  the 
New  York  Stock  Exchange.  Dividends  are  declared  each 
business  day  before  share  orders  are  processed.  There- 
fore,  at  one  of  these  MMFs,  a purchase  order  effective  on 
Monday  is  not  credited  with  dividends  until  Tuesday.  A 
redemption  request  on  Tuesday  would  result  in  the  shares 
being  redeemed  at  the  close  of  the  NYSE  that  day. 
Remittance  would  not  be  sent  until  Wednesday  at  the 
earliest,  with  only  one  day’s  dividends.  Check-writing 
redemption  avoids  the  loss  of  a  day’s  dividends  because 
shares  earn  dividends  up  to  and  including  the  day  the 
check  is  presented  to  the  MMF’s  bank. 
Table  II 
TURNOVER  RATES  AT  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  MONEY  MARKET  FUNDS 
July ‘77  Oct.  ‘77  Jan.  ‘78  April  ‘78  July ‘78  Oct.  '78  Jan.  ‘79  April  ‘79 
Demand  Deposits  128.1  134.6  131.5  138.0  139.4  144.1  151.2  156.8 
Savings  Deposits 
All  Customers  1.6  1.7  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.7  3.2 
Business  Customers  4.0  4.5  4.7  4.7  5.1  5.8  6.8  7.0 
Others  1.5  1.5  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.5  3.0 
Money  Market  Fund  Shares  3.1  3.3  3.6  3.7  3.5  3.7  3.8  3.1 
Note:  Turnover  rate  for  demand  deposits  are  seasonally  adjusted.  Turnover  rates  for  ravings  deposits  and  MMF  shares  are  not  season- 
ally  adjusted. 
Sources:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin;  Donoghue’s  Money  Fund  Report  of  Holliston,  Mass. 
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remainder  of  the  MMFs  surveyed  potentially  allow 
the  investor  to  avoid  uninvested  days.  Thus,  a  cor- 
poration  investing  in  one  of  these  MMFs  on  Monday 
could  earn  one  day’s  dividends  and  expect  remittance 
on  Tuesday.15  However,  MMF  prospectuses  rarely 
provide  guarantees  as  to  what  day,  let  alone  what 
time,  remittance  will  be  sent.  A  MMF’s  delay  in 
remitting  payment  may  mean  lost  investment  oppor- 
tunities  and  a  lower  effective  yield  for  the  corpora- 
tion.  Thus,  the  attractiveness  of  a  very  short-term 
MMF  investment  to  a corporation  may  be  diminished 
by  the  uncertainty  as  to  when  remittance  can  be 
expected,  an  uncertainty  largely  absent  in  repurchase 
agreements.  Nevertheless,  if  one  of  the  MMFs  in 
this  second  group  provides  assurances  of  prompt 
remittance  for  redeemed  shares,  a  MMF  could  offer 
corporations  a  competitive  alternative  to  RPs  de- 
pending  on  the  relative  net  yields  of  the  two  forms 
of  investment. 
The  second,  and  probably  more  important,  reason 
for  the  limited  use  of  MMF  shares  for  transactions 
purposes  is  a  degree  of  unwillingness  on  the  part  of 
MMFs  to  serve  their  shareholders’  transactions 
needs.  Rapid  turnover  of  shares  involves  significant 
costs  arising  from  bank  charges  for  processing  checks 
and  the  MMF’s  expenses  when  shares  are  redeemed. 
MMFs  have  not  developed  pricing  systems  that  allo- 
cate  these  costs  to  individual  shareholders  who  turn- 
over  shares  rapidly.  In  the  absence  of  such  systems, 
MMFs  sometimes  find  it  necessary  to  simply  restrict 
the  turnover  activity  of  some  investors.  A  dramatic 
example  is  provided  by  the  MMF,  cited  earlier, 
whose  turnover  rate  reached  a  level  of  over  100 
because  one  corporation  was  using  this  MMF  exten- 
sively  for  transactions  purposes.  Subsequently,  the 
corporation  was  asked  to  refrain  from  doing  so  and 
within  a  month  the  fund’s  turnover  rate  plummeted 
to  2. 
This  discussion  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  under 
no  circumstances  would  a  MMF  tolerate  rapid  turn- 
over  of its  shares  by  an  investor.  The  costs  associated 
15  Shares  can  be  purchased  and  redeemed  in  most  of 
these  MMFs  on  business  days  at  noon  and  at  4  p.m. 
Eastern  time.  Dividends  are  credited  just  prior  to  the 
processing  of  share  orders  at  either  noon  or  4,  depending 
on  the  MMF,  to  shareholders  of  record.  In  the  case  that 
the  MMF  declares  dividends  at  noon,  for  example,  a 
purchase  order  effected  at  either  noon  or  4  p.m. Monday 
would  first  receive  dividends  at  noon  Tuesday. If the 
investor’s  redemption  request  was  received  before  noon 
on  Tuesday,  shares  would  be  redeemed  at  noon  and  pay- 
ment  with  a  day’s  dividends  could  be  expected  that  after- 
noon. 
with  a  redemption  of  shares  are  relatively  fixed, 
while  the  fees  earned  by  the  MMFs  manager  and 
advisor  on  an  investor’s  funds  are  positively  related 
to  the  size  of  the  shareholder’s  investment.  Hence, 
the  willingness  of  a  MMF  to  tolerate  turnover  by  a 
given  customer  should  increase  with  the  average  size 
of  the  customer’s  investment.  For  any  share  turn- 
over  rate  there  should  be  an  average  share  level  at 
which  the  MMF  will  permit  that  rate  of  turnover. 
If  the  investor  is  not  maintaining  that  level  then, 
under  current  institutional  arrangements,  the  only 
options  available  to  the  MMF  are  to  ask  the  in- 
vestor  to  decrease  the  turnover  rate  of  his  shares 
or  to  refuse  to  accept  new  share  purchase  orders  from 
the  investor.16 
MMFs  Versus  Direct  Money  Market  Investment 
Nonfinancial  corporations  also  have  a  very  large 
volume  of  direct  investments  in  money  market  instru- 
ments  such  as  CDs  and  commercial  paper.  The 
decision  of  a  corporation  to  use  an  in-house  program 
of  direct  investment  in  the  money  market  or  to  use 
MMFs  is  solely  dependent  on  which  investment 
mechanism  offers  the  highest  net  yield  consistent 
with  the  desired  degree  of  liquidity  and  diversifica- 
tion.  Corporations  do  not  appear  to  be  significantly 
affected  in  this  decision  by  government  regulations. 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  small-sized  cor- 
porations  with  savings  deposits  at  the  depository 
institutions  are,  like  individuals,  affected  by  Regula- 
tion  Q  ceilings.  (There  was  $10.3  billion  of corporate 
savings  deposits  outstanding  in  June  1979.) 
Conversations  with  MMF  officials  reveal  that 
those  corporations  that  are  using  MMFs  are  at  the 
smaller  end  of the  size  spectrum,  which  seems  reason- 
able  since  corporations  with  smaller  amounts  of 
short-term  funds  available  for  investment  are  more 
likely  to  benefit  from  the  advantages  a  MMF  offers 
as  a  financial  intermediary.  The  ability  to  offer  these 
16  The  rapid  growth  of  MMFs  in  1978  resulted  in  much 
speculation  on  the  impact  of  MMFs  on  the  growth  rates 
of  the  monetary  aggregates.  Most  of  this  speculation 
centered  on  whether  or  not  MMFs  were  a  factor  con- 
tributing  to  the  slowdown  in  the  growth  rate  of  M1  in 
the  fall  of  1978.  The  main  argument  for  the  presence  of 
an  effect  of  MMFs  on  M1  is  that  the  liquidity  of  an 
investment  in  MMFs -especially  the  check-writing  fea- 
ture-makes  them  a  virtually  perfect,  interest-earning 
substitute  to  M1  for  transactions  purposes.  This  argu- 
ment  fails  to  take  into  account  the  almost  universal  mini- 
mum  $500  requirement  on  checks.  Nor  does  it  consider 
the  two  factors  limiting  the  use  of  MMFs  for  transactions 
purposes  discussed  in  this  section.  In  any  case  the  MMF 
share  turnover  rate  data  provide  virtually  no  support  for 
the  position  that  MMFs  have  served  as  a  close  substitute 
for  demand  deposits. 
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The  greater  size  of  the  MMF’s  portfolio  may  enable 
the  small  corporation  to  gain  greater  liquidity  and 
diversification  than  it  could  get  by  running  an  in- 
house  money  market  investment  program.  Also,  if 
there  are  economies  of  scale  in  the  operation  of  cor- 
porate  money  market  investment  programs,  as  there 
appear  to  be  in  the  operation  of  MMFs  [7],  the  small 
corporation  may  gain  a  higher  net  yield  by  investing 
through  a  MMF  than  through  an  in-house  program. 
II.  MONEY  MARKET  FUND  YIELDS 
The  assumption  that  MMFs  offer  rates  of  return 
comparable  to  money  market  rates  underpin  the  two 
broad  explanations  advanced  above  for  the  rapid 
growth  of  MMF  assets.  The  first  emphasized  the 
ability  of  MMFs  to  provide  money  market  rates  to 
those  previously  denied  access.  The  second  explana- 
tion  emphasized  the  advantages  offered  to  some  in- 
vestors  by  MMFs  which  act  as  an  intermediary  for 
short-term  funds.  One  such  advantage  is  that,  due 
especially  to  economies  of  scale,  some  investors  can 
gain  a  higher  net  rate  of  return  by  investing  in  a 
MMF  than  by  investing  directly  in  the  money  mar- 
ket.  As  both  explanations  depend  heavily  on  the 
assumption  that  rates  of  return  on  MMF  investments 
and  on  other  money  market  instruments  are  com- 
parable,  this  section  will  examine  the  relationship 
between  MMF  and  money  market  yields.  The  fol- 
lowing  section  analyzes  the  growth  of  MMF  assets 
in  the  context  of  a  MMF  yield  series  developed 
below. 
A  crucial  distinction  must  be  made  in  comparing 
MMF  rates  with  money  market  rates.  When  pur- 
chasing  a  money  market  security,  the  investor  is 
quoted  a  rate  of  return  that  he  will  receive  if  he  holds 
that  security  to  maturity,  assuming  the  issuer  does 
not  default.  A  purchaser  of  MMF  shares,  on  the 
other  hand,  receives  no  quotation  as  to  what  return 
he  will  gain  if he  holds  his  shares  for  a certain  period. 
Rather,  a  yield  quoted  to  the  investor  on  the  date  of 
purchase  indicates  the  annualized  net  yield  received 
on  an  investment  in  the  MMF  over  the  past  day, 
week,  month,  or  year.  The  actual  yield  received  by 
the  MMF  investor  is  determined  after  he  purchases 
his  shares,  and  is  influenced  by  many  factors.  These 
factors  are  (1)  the  general  level  of  money  market 
yields,  (2)  the  composition  of  assets  of  the  MMF, 
(3)  the  expenses  of  the  fund  absorbed  by  its  share- 
owners,  (4)  the  movement  in  interest  rates  over  the 
period  shares  are  held  and  (5)  the  accounting  pro- 
cedure  used  by  the  fund  to  calculate  share  prices  and 
daily  dividends. 
The  MMF  investor’s  yield  is  fundamentally 
dependent  on  the  interest  accrued  daily  on  the 
MMF’s  ever-changing  portfolio  of  securities.  The 
amount  of  interest  accrued  depends  on  the  general 
level  of  money  market  yields  and  on  the  type  and 
maturity  of  securities  held  at  a  given  time.  MMFs 
vary  considerably  in  both  the  type  and  average  ma- 
turity  of  securities  held.  A  large  percentage  of  most 
MMFs’  holdings  are  in  domestic  and  Eurodollar 
CDs,  commercial  paper  and  Treasury  bills,  but  vari- 
ous  other  high  grade  money  market  instruments  are 
also  commonly  purchased.  A  small  number  of  MMFs 
have  restricted  their  portfolio  investments  to  pur- 
chases  of  government  securities,  apparently  to  attract 
more  risk-averse  investors.  Chart  3  shows  the  asset 
composition  of  all  MMFs  from  the  third  quarter  of 
1975  to  the  first  quarter  of  1979.  The  aggregate 
asset  composition  of  MMFs  appears  to  be  quite  re- 
sponsive  to  changes  in  yield  differentials.  For  in- 
stance,  the  large  spread  between  Treasury  bill  rates 
and  other  money  market  rates  in  the  latter  half  of 
1978  resulted  in  a  significant  movement  out  of  gov- 
ernment  securities. 
Another  important  determinant  of  the  yield  re- 
ceived  by  an  investor  in  a  MMF  is  the  expenses 
deducted  from  the  income  of  the  fund  before  divid- 
ends  are  declared  each  day.  The  percent  of  net 
expenses  (total  expenses  minus  expenses  absorbed 
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annual  basis  varies  in  a  range  from  0.4  to  1.4,  al- 
though  most  funds  have  net  expense  ratios  of  1.0 
percent  or  less.  MMF  expenses  are  discussed  in 
more  detail  in  the  third  article  in  this  Review. 
The  extent  of  movement  in  market  interest  rates 
over  the  period  shares  are  held  also  affects  the  in- 
vestor’s  yield.  These  movements  affect  the  rate 
earned  on  new  assets  of  the  MMF  and  also  result 
in  capital  gains  or  losses  on  the  assets  already  held 
by  the  MMF.  The  magnitude  of  the  gains  or  losses 
is  inversely  related  to  the  average  maturity  of  the 
MMF’s  assets.  The  shorter  the  average  maturity, 
the  less  the  change  in  market  value  of  the  MMF’s 
portfolio  resulting  from  a  given  change  in  market 
rates. 
The  influence  of  capital  gains  and  losses  on  the 
MMF’s  yield  depends  on  the  accounting  procedures 
used  by  the  fund.  Some  funds,  using  “mark-to- 
market”  accounting  procedures  pass  on  these  gains 
or  losses  (whether  realized  or  not)  on  a  daily 
basis.  Others,  using  “amortized  cost”  accounting 
methods,  do  not  allow  unrealized  capital  gains  or 
losses  to  affect  yield.  The  yield  of  an  investor  in  a 
MMF  that  uses  amortized  cost  valuation  may  be 
affected  by  net  redemptions  (sales)  of  the  MMF’s 
shares  in  periods  of  rising  (falling)  market  rates. 
The  accounting  methods  used  by  MMFs  have  been 
the  center  of  substantial  controversy,  not  yet  fully 
resolved.  The  Box  describes  in  greater  detail  the 
various  accounting  methods  used  by  MMFs  and 
outlines  the  nature  of  the  controversy. 
As  noted  above,  all  quoted  MMF  yields  are  ex 
post  yields,  based  on  the  behavior  of  a  MMF  over  a 
certain  period  of  time  in  the  past.  By  contrast,  the 
quoted  rate  on  a money  market  instrument  represents 
the  promised  yield  on  a  security  held  to  maturity.  In 
order  to  compare  MMF  yields  with  money  market 
yields  it  is  useful  to  construct  an  ex  ante  yield  series 
for  MMFs  that  would  be  similar  in  concept  to  yield- 
to-maturity  series  for  money  market  instruments. 
Table  III  presents  such  an  ex ante  average  yield 
series  for  the  five  largest  MMFs  by  asset  size.  The 
series  was  constructed  using  money  market  rates  and 
MMF  asset  composition  and  average  maturity  data. 
Specifically,  each  MMF’s  ex  ante  yield  for  each 
month  was  determined  by  calculating  the  yield-to- 
maturity  on  a  portfolio  with  the  same  asset  composi- 
tion  as  the  MMF,  under  the  assumption  that  each 
security  in  the  portfolio  matured  in  the  number  of 
days  equal  to  the  average  maturity  of  the  MMF’s 
assets.  The ex  ante  yield  series  was  then  calculated 
using  an  asset-weighted  average  of  the  five  MMFs’ 
ex ante  yield  series.  Finally,  60  basis  points  were 
subtracted  from  each  month’s  annualized  yield  to 
form  a  yield  series  net  of  expenses.  This  60  basis 
points  figure  is  roughly  equal  to  the  average  annual 
expense  ratio  over  the  1975-78  period  of  the  five 
MMFs  that  were  most  consistently  among  the  largest 
five  MMFs. 
Table  Ill 
AVERAGE  EX  ANTE  YIELD  SERIES 
FOR  FIVE  LARGEST  MMFs 




Oct.  1975  5.90  78 
Nov.  1975  5.36  86 
Dec.  1975  5.41  79 
Jan.  1976  4.68  119 
Feb.  1976  4.75  125 
Mar.  1976  4.80  113 
Apr.  1976  4.49  104 
May  1976  4.95  95 
June  1976  5.27  94 
July  1976  4.98  104 
Aug.  1976  4.87  111 
Sept.  1976  4.82  115 
Oct.  1976  4.46  111 
Nov.  1976  4.38  107 
Dec.  1976  4.10  122 
Jan.  1977  4.31  105 
Feb.  1977  4.25  108 
Mar.  1977  4.28  98 
Apr.  1977  4.28  105 
May  1977  4.99  97 
June  1977  4.87  102 
July  1977  4.93  96 




Aug.  1977  5.39  90 
Sept.  1977  5.65  83 
Oct.  1977  6.00  75 
Nov.  1977  6.01  88 
Dec.  1977  6.02  87 
Jan.  1978  6.34  82 
Feb.  1978  6.27  87 
Mar.  1978  6.21  91 
Apr.  1978  6.40  80 
May  1978  6.73  76 
June  1978  7.31  69 
July  1978  7.44  65 
Aug.  1978  7.51  75 
Sept.  1978  8.14  68 
Oct.  1978  8.66  60 
Nov.  1978  9.55  52 
Dec.  1978  9.96  50 
Jan.  1979  9.56  50 
Feb.  1979  9.54  54 
Mar.  1979  9.45  50 
Apr.  1979  9.28  48 
Note:  The  average  ex  ante  yield  series  for  the  five  largest  MMFs 
was  constructed  in  the  following  way:  (1)  Asset  composition 
and  average  maturity  data  for  the  five  largest  MMFs  (by 
asset  size)  in  each  month  were  collected  from  Donoghue’s 
Money  Fund  Report  of  Holliston,  Mass.  (2)  Each  MMF’s  entire 
portfolio  was  assumed  to  mature  in  the  number  of  days 
given  by  the  MMF’s  average  maturity.  Yields  for  each  type 
of  security  held  were  determined  from  1-month,  3-month,  and 
6-month  yield  series  by  extrapolation  and  interpolation  as- 
suming  a  linear  term  structure.  For  securities  for  which  yield 
data  were  not  available,  such  as  RPs  and  securities  in  the 
“other”  category,  the  yield  was  assumed  to  be  the  simple 
average  of  the  yields  on  other  securities  in  the  portfolio.  All 
yields  were  converted  into  annualized  percentage  rates.  (3) 
The  ex  ante  yield  for  each  MMF  in  each  month  was  calculated 
as  the  overage  yield  on  the  securities  held,  weighted  by  the 
percentage  of  each  security  type  in  the  portfolio,  minus  60 
basis  points  for  expenses.  (4)  For  each  month,  an  asset- 
weighted  average  yield  and  an  asset-weighted  overage 
maturity  were  found  for  the  five  MMFs. 
Sources:  Salomon  Brothers,  Bond  Market  Roundup;  Donoghue’s 
Money  Fund  Report  of  Holliston,  Mass. 
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net  yield  that  could  be  expected  from  a  MMF  invest- 
ment  held  at  the  time  indicated  over  the  period  given 
by  the  average  maturity  of  the  MMFs’  portfolio.17 
The  series  is  comparable  to  yields  on  money  market 
instruments  except  that  the  maturity  of  the  MMF 
portfolio  varies  and  the  MMF  yield  series  is  net  of 
investment  costs.  Thus,  the  series  is  useful  in  show- 
ing  the  relative  attractiveness  of  a  MMF  investment 
at  a  given  time.  The  yield  that  should  be  compared 
to  this  MMF  yield  series  depends  on  the  investor  in 
question.  For  individuals  with  less  than  $10,000  to 
invest,  the  relevant  alternative  rate  is  the  Regulation 
17 The  implicit  assumption  underlying  the  construction  of 
the  ex  ante  yield  series  is  that  interest  rates  remain  con- 
stant  over  the  period  given  by  the  average  maturity. 
Expectations  of  interest  rate  fluctuations  will  affect  the 
expected  MMF  yield  for  two  reasons.  First,  as  securities 
mature  new  assets  are  purchased  at  different  rates.  Sec- 
ond,  under  the  mark-to-market  method  of  valuing  MMF 
portfolios,  the  capital  gains  or  losses  on  the  MMF’s  port- 
folio  associated  with  interest  rate  fluctuations  will  accrue 
to  shareholders  whether  they  are  realized  or  not. 
Q  ceiling  rate  on  savings  deposits  and  small  short- 
term  time  deposits.  For  individuals  with  greater 
than  $10,000,  it  is  the  yield  on  Treasury  bills  and 
money  market  certificates  at  depository  institutions. 
And  for  investors  with  sufficient  funds  to  invest  in 
other  money  market  instruments,  such  as  commercial 
paper  and  CDs,  it  is  the  yield  on  these  instruments. 
Of  course,  as  noted,  the  yields  on  money  market 
instruments  are  gross  yields  whereas  the  MMF  yield 
series  is  net  of  expenses. 
III.  GROWTH  OF  MMFs 
Chart  4  compares  (1)  the  differential  between  the 
ex  ante money  market  fund  yield  series  derived  above 
and  the  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rate  on  savings  deposits 
at  thrift  institutions  with  (2)  monthly  changes  in  the 
dollar  volume  of  MMF  shares  outstanding.  The 
chart  shows  that  MMFs  experienced  little  net  con- 
traction  in  assets  during  1976  and  the  first  half  of 
1977,  despite  ex ante  MMF  yields  that  were  well 
below  the  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rate  for  savings  de- 
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rate  and  the  savings  deposit  rate  rose  to  roughly  100 
basis  points  in  late  1977  and  early  1978,  MMF  assets 
increased  by  $0.5  billion  per  month  on  average.  The 
monthly  changes  in  the  dollar  volume  of  MMF 
shares  outstanding  remained  at  that  level  throughout 
most  of  1978,  while  the  spread  between  the  ex  ante 
yield  series  and  the  savings  deposit  rate  rose  to  200 
basis  points  in  the  middle  of  the  year.  After  market 
interest  rates  increased  further  in  the  fall  of  1978, 
however,  the  monthly  increases  in  money  market 
fund  shares  rose  sharply.  By  the  first  month  of  1979, 
the  increase  in  MMF  shares  was  over  $2  billion  per 
month  and  the  monthly  increase  remained  at  that 
level  through  the  first  five  months  of  1979. 
The  rough  association  between  the  rise  in  the 
spread  between  the  MMF  yield  series  and  the  Regu- 
lation  Q  ceiling  rate  and  the  increases  in  money  mar- 
ket  fund  shares  explains  the  belief  that  the  growth  of 
MMFs  was  solely  a  result  of  funds  being  withdrawn 
from  the  deposit  institutions  and  put  into  MMFs. 
According  to  this  view,  the  only  function  served  by 
MMFs  is  to  provide  access  to  money  market  yields 
to  individuals  having  relatively  small  amounts  of 
funds  to  invest.  While  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  a 
significant  part  of  the  growth  of  MMFs  has  resulted 
from  the  withdrawal  of  funds  by  individuals  from 
the  deposit  institutions,  the  position  taken  in  this 
article  is  that  much  of  the  growth  over  this  period 
also  represented  a  lasting  change  in  the  way  some 
investors  manage  their  short-term  assets.  The  best 
example  of  this  fundamental  change  is  the  case  of 
small-  and  medium-sized  bank  trust  departments, 
which  use  MMFs  to  manage  their  short-term  assets 
in  order  to  take  advantage  of  the  economies  of  scale 
resulting  from  the  pooling  of  large  amounts  of  funds. 
The  answer  to  the  question  of  whether  the  growth. 
in  MMFs  is  simply  a  result  of  government  regula- 
tions  or  whether  it  also  is  due  to  other  advantages 
MMFs  offer  investors  as  a  financial  intermediary 
would  be  aided  by  a  breakdown  of  money  market 
shares  by  investor  category.  Large  investors,  such  as 
bank  trust  departments  and  corporations,  have  access 
to  the  money  market.  Hence,  growth  in  those  sectors 
cannot  be  attributed  primarily  to  Regulation  Q. 
While  there  are  no  comprehensive  data  on  ownership 
of  money  market  fund  shares  by  type  of  investor, 
there  is  some  useful  information. 
Beginning  in  late 1977,  a  number  of  funds  began 
to  limit  their  investors  to  institutions  (i.e.,  all  in- 
vestors  except  individuals)  and  to  require  minimum 
initial-  investments  of  $50,000.18  It  is  possible  to 
derive  a  series  beginning  at  that  point  in  time  for 
funds  that  deal  only  with  institutions.  This  series 
does  not  include  all  institutional  money  in  MMFs, 
since  many  of  the  other  MMFs  also  have  significant 
amounts  of  institutional  money.  Chart  5  shows  the 
growth  of  MMFs  divided  into  three  groups:  (1) 
those  MMFs  that  deal  only  with  institutions,  (2) 
general  purpose  MMFs  sponsored  by  stockbrokers 
and  (3)  other  general  purpose  MMFs.19  Many  of 
the  MMFs  in  the  third  group  are  part  of  a  fund 
group  having  a  variety  of  different  mutual  funds. 
The  chart  shows  that  the  group  of  MMFs  excluding 
individual  investors  had  grown  to  $6.5  billion  by  the 
end  of  May  1979. 
Information  on  the  relative  ownership  of  shares  by 
institutions  and  individuals  is  also  provided  by  a 
survey  conducted  by  the  Investment  Company  Insti- 
tute  [10]  at  the  end  of  1978.  The  survey  estimated 
18 These  restrictions  were  imposed  as  part  of  an  agree- 
ment  with  the  SEC.  Under  this  agreement  these  MMFs 
were  given  temporary  permission  to  use  straight-line 
accrual  accounting  methods  under  certain  conditions. 
Two  of  these  conditions  were  that  the  MMFs  restrict 
themselves  to  institutional  investors  and  set  minimum 
account  size  at  $50,000. 
19 This  classification  and  the  data  used  to  construct  the 
series  are  taken  from  Donoghue’s  Money  Fund  Report, 
of  Holliston,  Mass. 
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was  held  by  individuals  and  54  percent  was  held  by 
institutions  (the  rapid  growth  of  the  stockbroker- 
sponsored  MMFs  in  1979  has  probably  increased  the 
percent  of  shares  held  by  individuals).  It  seems 
likely  that  at  least  half  and  probably  as  much  as 
three-quarters  of  the  total  MMF  shares  held  by 
institutions  at  the  end  of  1978  were  held  by  bank 
trust  departments.20 
With  regard  to  investment  in  MMFs  by  individ- 
uals,  it  is  impossible  to  estimate  how  much  is  coming 
from  individuals  seeking  access  to  the  money  market 
and  how  much  is  from  individuals  who  already  had 
this  access  but  who  are  nevertheless  attracted  to 
MMFs  for  other  reasons.  It  appears,  however,  that  a 
significant  amount  of  money  from  this  source  is 
coming  from  individuals  who  are  not  using  MMFs 
primarily  to  gain  access  to  money  market  yields. 
Three  pieces  of  information  support  this  conclusion. 
The  first  is  the  rapid  growth  of  the  stockbroker- 
sponsored  MMFs,  which  by  May  1979  had  combined 
assets  of  roughly  $10  billion,  Most  of  the  money  in 
these  MMFs  comes  from  individuals  through  brok- 
ers.21  It  seems  unlikely  that  a  large  part  of  the 
growth  of  these  MMFs  is  due  to  money  being  with- 
drawn  by  small  investors  from  deposit  institutions. 
Rather  it  appears  that  most  of  the  growth  in  this 
group  of  MMFs  has  resulted  from  larger  investors 
taking  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offered  by 
MMFs  as  an  investment  vehicle  for  funds  freed  by 
the  sale  of  market  securities. 
The  second  piece  of  information  on  individual  use 
of  MMFs  is  data  on  MMF  shares  purchased  and 
redeemed  due  to  exchanges  with  other  types  of  mu- 
tual  funds  in  a  fund  group.  These  data  suggest  ex- 
tensive  use  of  MMFs  by  individuals  for  this  pur- 
pose.  Monthly  purchases  of  MMF  shares  with 
money  redeemed  from  other  funds  averaged  $178 
million  a  month  in  the  year  ending  April  1979,  and 
redemptions  of  MMFs  for  the  purpose  of  buying 
shares  of  other  mutual  funds  in  a  fund  group  aver- 
aged  $135  million  per  month  over  the  same  period. 
20 This  estimate  is  based  on  conversations  with  MMF 
officials.  The  Investment  Company  Institute  survey 
estimates  that  at  the  end  of  1978  51.8  percent  of  institu- 
tional  shares  were  held  by  “total  fiduciary  accounts.” 
This  figure  probably  understates  the  trust  department 
percentage  because  the  survey  also  estimates  that  20.7 
percent  of  institutional  shares  were  held  by  “other  insti- 
tutional  accounts”  and  7.6  percent  were  held  by  “total 
employee  plans.”  Both  of  these  categories  probably 
include  some  funds  handled  by  bank  trust  departments. 
21 Tyson  [11]  reports  that  98 percent  of  the  shareholders 
of  the  largest  MMF  (with  assets  of  over  $4  billion  in 
June  1979)  were  already  customers  of  the  brokerage 
firm  that  operates  the  fund. 
From  January  1978  through  April  1979  the  differ- 
ence  between  total  MMF  share  sales  due  to  ex- 
changes  and  total  MMF  redemptions  due  to  ex- 
changes  was  $619  million.22  This  figure  is  an  esti- 
mate  of  the  growth  of  MMFs  due  to  exchanges  with 
other  mutual  funds. 
Lastly,  information  on  individual  participation  in 
MMFs  comes  from  the  Investment  Company  Insti- 
tute  survey  cited  above.  This  survey  gathered  data 
on  average  account  size  for  individuals  and  institu- 
tions.  The  average  account  size  for  individual  in- 
vestors  of  the  30  MMFs  (representing  43.5%  of 
total  MMF  assets)  which  provided  detailed  data  for 
the  survey  was  $11,905.23  Since  this  figure  is  above 
the  $10,000  minimum  required  for  purchases  of 
Treasury  bills  and  money  market  certificates,  it  im- 
plies  that  many  individual  MMF  shareholders  have 
these  investment  alternatives.  Of  course,  the  average 
is  low  enough  to  indicate  that  there  are  many  individ- 
uals  with  accounts  smaller  than  $10,000  for  whom 
MMFs  do  provide  the  only  access  to  money  market 
yields. 
Before  concluding  this  section,  it  should  be  noted 
that  one  basic  question  has  not  been  raised.  If,  as 
the  evidence  indicates,  MMFs  are  not  only  a  reaction 
to  government  regulations  but  also  represent  a  new 
form  of  specialization  in  the  financial  markets,  what 
economic  explanation  accounts  for  the  timing  of  this 
new  form  of  specialization?  That  is,  why  did  MMFs 
spring  up  in  the  1970’s  when  mutual  funds  for  stocks 
and  bonds  started  decades  earlier?  A  thorough 
answer  to  that  question  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
paper.  However,  one  possible  explanation  is  that 
because  MMFs  have  many  more  shareholder  trans- 
actions  than  do  mutual  funds  for  stocks  or  bonds, 
they  were  not  economically  feasible  prior  to  advances 
in  computer  technology  in  the  late  1960’s  and  1970’s 
that  reduced  the  administrative  and  recordkeeping 
expenses  associated  with  these  transactions. 
IV.  CONCLUSION:  THE  FUTURE  OF  MMFs 
The  central  conclusion  of  this  paper  is  that  the 
rapid  growth  of  MMFs  in  1978  and  1979  has  been 
both  a  reaction  to  government  regulations  and  a 
result  of  fundamental  changes  in  the  way  some  insti- 
tutional  and  individual  investors  manage  their  short- 
22 These  figures  were  provided  by  the  Investment  Com- 
pany  Institute. 
23 The  average  account  size  for  institutions  of  the  30 
MMFs  that  provided  detailed  data  was  $34,904.  How- 
ever,  as  noted  in  footnote  1,  this  figure  is  difficult  to 
interpret  because  of  the  difference  in  the  way  these  ac- 
counts  are  treated  by  different  MMFs. 
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is  that  MMFs  will  survive  as  a  new  intermediary  in  rough  estimate  of  the  amount  of  funds  potentially 
the  financial  markets  regardless  of  the  future  course  available  to  MMFs  from  this  source  is  derived  in 
of  government  regulations  that  have  contributed  to  Table  IV.  The  information  used  in  deriving  this 
their  growth  in  the  past.  While  the  future  growth  of  estimate  consists  of  (1)  the  fraction  of  short-term 
MMFs  can  not  be  predicted  with  any  certainty,  some  to  total  assets  of  bank  trust  departments  and  (2)  the 
limited  comments  can  be  made  regarding  the  three  fractions  of  short-term  funds  in  different  size  bank 
major  categories  of  investors  discussed  in  the  paper.  trust  departments  potentially  available  to  MMFs. 
Individuals  Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates  on  savings 
and  short-term  time  deposits  less  than  $10,000  have 
been  a  major  factor  underlying  the  participation  of 
individuals  in  MMFs.  As  long  as  MMFs  offer  small 
savers  the  only  means  of  gaining  access  to  money 
market  yields,  the  use  of  MMFs  by  individuals  and, 
hence,  the  level  of  MMF  assets  will  be  sensitive  to 
the  differential  between  money  market  rates  and 
Regulation  Q  ceiling  rates.  Much  of  the  growth  of 
individual  participation  in  MMFs,  however,  is  attrib- 
utable  to  factors  other  than  the  limited  access  of  small 
savers.  Individuals  with  $10,000  or  more  to  invest 
find  MMFs  attractive  because  of  the  advantages 
they  offer  as  a financial  intermediary:  diversification, 
liquidity,  possibly  higher  net  yield,  etc.  Moreover, 
the  growth  of  the  stockbroker-sponsored  MMFs  sug- 
gests  that  MMFs  are  attractive  to  the  individual 
investor  as  a  repository  for  money  available  after  a 
sale  of  stocks,  bonds,  or  other  financial  assets.  The 
exchange  privilege  offered  by  many  MMFs  in  mutual 
fund  groups  is  a  further,  but  less  important,  reason 
why  use  of  MMFs  by  individuals  should  continue 
regardless  of  the  future  of  Regulation  Q. 
The  first  fraction  is  estimated  largely  on  the  basis 
of  the  ratio  of  STIF  assets  to  total  assets  for  the 
national  trust  departments  that  reported  STIFs  in  the 
common  trust  fund  survey  discussed  in  Section  I.24 
This  ratio,  .067,  probably  understates  the  true  ratio 
of  short-term  to  total  trust  department  assets  because 
money  from  agency  accounts  of  personal  trusts  and 
estates  cannot  be  put  into  STIFs.  Consequently,  the 
estimate  used  in  Table  II  is  set  slightly  higher.  The 
increase  in  the  estimate  is  based  on  the  ratio  of  assets 
of  agency  accounts  of  personal  trusts  and  estates  to 
total  trust  department  assets.  For  each  size  category 
of  bank  trust  department,  the  portion  of  short-term 
funds  potentially  available  to  MMFs  is  based  pri- 
marily  on  the  frequency  of  STIF  usage  by  trust 
department  size  shown  in  Table  I.  The  assumption 
is  that  money  in,  or  likely  to  end  up in,  STIFs  is  not 
potentially  available  to  MMFs. 
Column  (5)  in  Table  IV  gives  the  estimate  of  total 
short-term  funds  potentially  available  for  MMFs 
from  each  trust  department  size  category.  The  total 
Bank  Trust  Departments  The  flow  of  funds  into 
MMFs  from  bank  trust  departments  is  primarily  a 
basic  change  in  the  way  small-  and  medium-sized 
24 It  would  be  more  desirable  to  calculate  the  ratio  of 
short-term  assets  to  total  assets  directly.  Data  on  trust 
assets  are  collected  in  the  annual  survey,  Trust  Assets  of 
Insured  Commercial  Banks  [5].  The  data,  however,  are 
not  collected  in  a  manner  that  permits  the  division  of 
short-term  and  long-term  assets. 
Table  IV 






Estimate  of  Ratio 
of  Short-Term  to 
Total  Assets 
(2) 
Estimate  of  Total 
Short-Term  Assets 
($ millions) 
(3)  =  (1)  x  (2) 
Estimate  of  Fraction  Estimate  of  Total 
of  Short-Term  Assets  Short-Term  Assets 
Available  to  MMFs  Available  to  MMFs 
($  millions) 
(4)  (5)  =  (3)  x  (4) 
Less than  $100  million  5,546  .08  444  1.0  444 
$10-25  million  7,555  .08  604  1.0  604 
$25-100  million  .08  2,123  1.0  2,123  26,535 
$100-500  million  59,242  .08  4,739  0.8  3,791 
$500  million-1 billion  38,128  .08  3,050  0.5  1,525 
More  than  $1  billion  365,709  .08  29,257  0.2  5,851 
TOTAL  502,715  40,217  14,338 
Note:  The  derivation  of  the  estimate  in  column  (2)  is  described  in  the  text.  Estimates  in  column  (4)  are  based  on  Table  I. 
Source:  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  Federal  Deposit  insurance  Corporation,  and  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
Trust  Assets  of  Insured  Commercial  Banks  - 1977. 
30  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1979 estimate  is  $14.3  billion.  Of  course,  this  is  only  a  in  the  money  market.  This  decision  is  primarily 
rough  estimate.  (Also,  the  estimate,  which  is  based  based  on  which  investment  alternative  offers  the 
on  trust  assets  at  the  end  of  1977,  would  be  expected  highest  yield  net  of  expenses  consistent  with  the 
to  grow  slowly  as  trust  assets  increase.)  Neverthe-  desired  degree  of  liquidity  and  diversification.  An 
less,  the  estimate  makes  the  point  that  the  flow  of 
bank  trust  department  money  into  MMFs  will  prob- 
analysis  of  the  costs  involved  in  running  corporate 
ably  not  continue  at  the  rapid  pace  of  1978-79.  A 
money  market  investment  programs  was  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  paper.  If,  however,  MMFs  are  able  to 
reasonable  judgment  is  that  as  of  mid-1979  at  least 
half  of  the  trust  department  money  potentially  avail- 
offer  a  higher  net  yield  than  some  corporations  can 
able  to  MMFs  was  already  in  these  funds. 
gain  through  investing  directly  in  the  money  market, 
then  it  is  likely  that  corporate  use  of  MMFs  will 
One  caveat  should  be  added.  The  survey  of  Trust  grow  in  the  future. 
Assets  of  Insured  Commercial  Banks,  from  which 
the  total  assets  figures  in  column  (1)  of  Table  IV 
are  taken,  omits  strictly  custodial  agency  accounts 
and  corporate  trusts  and  corporate  agency  accounts. 
Strictly  custodial  agency  accounts  are  those  for  which 
the  trust  department  neither  exercises  investment 
discretion  nor  provides  investment  advice.25  Cor- 
porate  trusts  and  corporate  agency  accounts  are 
created  by  a corporation  to  secure  bond  issues  and  for 
other  purposes.  No  data  are  available  on  the  magni- 
tude  of  these  two  items. 
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